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An aerodynamic stall occurs when the critical angle of attack (AOA) of an aircraft is 
exceeded, causing reduced lift (Anderson, 1999). Failing to identify the situation and correctly 
apply an appropriate physical response in a timely manner can lead to the inability of an aircraft 
to sustain flight.  To warn pilots of an impending or fully developed stall, many aircraft have 
safety devices installed to provide visual, aural, and/or kinesthetic (haptic) indicators of a 
potentially unsafe situation. One form of stall warning is a stick shaker — a mechanical device 
that rapidly vibrates the pilot’s controls to alert the aircrew to an impending stall via haptic 
stimulus. Another common form is an aural alert system, and often the two are used in 
conjunction with one another.   
 In 2017, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published Advisory Circular 120-
111, which discussed requirements for Upset Recovery Training. One of the conditions that 
typically describe an upset is a pitch attitude of more than 25 degrees nose up, which is also one 
of the characteristics of a developing stall. The FAA specifically mentions how startle or 
surprise can adversely impact recognition and recovery (FAA, 2017). Goleman (1995) refers to 
the phenomenon as limbic hijack and defines it as the disruptive emotional and cognitive 
response that occurs as a result of stimulus (note: limbic hijack is disproportionate in severity to 
the actual stimulus). Colloquially known as a fight or flight trigger, amygdala or limbic hijack 
can cause a person to freeze in place or can disrupt cognitive function (Martin, Murray, & Bates, 
2012). A person experiencing this hijack cannot process available information or is unable to 
introduce corrective action in order to avert the original causal factor (Goleman, 1995). Stick 
shakers, if rapidly activated, can potentially produce unintended, negative reactions. While 
studies have suggested the activation of an aural alarm might result in amygdala hijack, little 
research has been conducted on how a stick shaker might create a similar disruption.  
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 The stick shaker has the potential to be a startling and violent form of stall warning. 
Well-meaning but intense warnings from the system could inadvertently produce a fight, freeze, 
or flight response from an aircrew. This article discusses how the stick shaker might cause a 
physiological and cognitive disruption to the recipient, identifies the risks associated with these 
types of systems, and suggest solutions to reduce negative consequences.   
Amygdala Hijack 
 According to Goleman (1995), when the brain receives information, stimulus travels to 
two places in the brain from the thalamus: the amygdala and the neocortex.  The neocortex is the 
thinking part of the brain, while the amygdala processes physiological response and fight or 
flight information. If stimulus is sent to the amygdala, it can hijack the rational part of the brain 
due to faster processing speeds (Goleman, 1995). When the amygdala perceives a threat, it forces 
the brain to command unexpected or unintended responses including irrational and destructive 
actions (Freedman, 2009).  
 “If the emotional brain does not like what it is seeing, it will declare an emotional 
emergency, an amygdala hijack” (Goleman, 1998, p. 20). Most individuals can only be effective 
when both the emotional and thinking brain work together (Goleman, 1998). In another 
definition of amygdala hijack: individuals are hardwired to instinctively protect themselves from 
harm—when specific threats present themselves, neurochemicals are released “that paralyze the 
brain’s ability to think and activate our instincts for fight, flight, freeze, and appease” (Glaser & 
Tartell, 2014, p. 63). Any perception of threat or distrust forces the amygdala to respond, thus 
locking down any response capabilities. Amygdala hijack can be found in many examples but is 
most likely to occur when individuals are placed in one of seven universal threats: tone threat, 
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hurt threat, risk & punishment threat, exclusion threat, anger threat, territory threat, and status 
threat (Glaser & Tartell, 2014).  
Stall Warning Devices 
It is easy for pilots to inadvertently fly themselves into the stall region known as 
Controlled Flight into Stall (CFIS) (Sherry & Mauro, 2014). Due to the ease of entering the stall 
region, stall warning devices are critical for situation awareness and are designed to immediately 
grab the attention of the pilot, as rectifying the stall should become the priority of the aircrew. A 
warning must accomplish certain human-reactions to be effective (Laughery & Wogalter, 2006). 
The warning must capture attention and be noticed, but just as important, the warning must 
provide desired information. Once the warning has effectively provided information to the 
person of interest, the warning should help influence behavior, not prevent undesired states. In 
some aircraft, the attention-capture function of a stall consists of shrill squeals and the shaking of 
the flight controls. The warning then provides information by annunciating the word, STALL, and 
lastly, the warning continues until the stall condition has been satisfied.  If the warning system is 
too violent in the capture attention phase, it is possible for the system to cause cognitive 
disruption that will prevent the pilot from advancing to the provide information stage.  
Aviation Perspective 
 Applying Glaser and Tartell’s (2014) theories, there are multiple situations where an 
individual can exhibit a marked decrease in cognitive function or experience an amygdala/limbic 
hijack, with hurt threat the most likely universal threat for a stall warning. The presence of a stall 
warning indicates the aircraft, along with all the passenger and cargo aboard, are in immediate 
and grave danger. The reaction to the shaker itself can come as a surprise to the pilot particularly 
if the pilot has failed to perceive any of the information contributing to the stall beforehand. 
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 There is another potential reason for the hijack, however. In the event pride is a driving 
factor, it may be possible for status threat or exclusion threat to be the overall cause of the 
hijack. In a stall, an experienced pilot may not want to feel the embarrassment of having flown 
into a situation that caused activation of the stick shaker and could feel shame, while at the same 
time, a lesser experienced co-pilot who enters the stall region may have feelings of inadequacy or 
inability to perform to the same level as the captain. Regardless, it is important to note that the 
high-frequency vibrations or the loud stall warning horn may not be the only cause of the 
amygdala hijack; a cultural situation could also be driving the outcome.  
Situation Awareness-Oriented Design Analysis 
The effects of startle on pilot-reactions and decision-making ability has been well 
documented on aviation accidents. On June 1, 2009, Air France Flight 447 entered a fully-
developed, sustained stall from which none of the flight crew were able to execute the proper 
reactions necessary to recover. According to Lacagnina (2012), among the causal factors for the 
accident were training deficiencies, lack of situation awareness (SA), ineffective crew resource 
management, and, what could be considered a catalyst, the startle effect.  
 Research has shown that not only does a startle activate the fight, freeze, or flight 
response in the recipient, it can also badly impair or even completely disrupt cognitive ability 
and psychomotor skills for up to 30 seconds or more (Martin et al., 2012). During this time, the 
disruption typically proceeds along one of three paths: 1) the initial disruption abates into 
conflict resolution; 2) the disruption leads to the wrong decision-making path; or 3) the 
disruption causes the person to freeze in place, also known as the fear-potentiated startle (Martin 
et al., 2012). There exists a cognitive sequence for alerts—perceive, diagnose, decision selection, 
and action (Pinet, 2012); these four steps closely mimic Endsley and Jones’ (2004) Levels 1 
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through 3 situational awareness sequence of perception, comprehension, and projection. 
However, even with a properly trained operator, these sequences can propagate dysfunction if 
the alert system does not adequately provide timely, relevant data. During the Air France mishap 
sequence, the aural stall warning systems onboard the A330 sounded 75 times in an attempt to 
alert the crew to the most immediate problem at hand (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses [BEA], 
2012). Despite the number of attempts, there was no verbal acknowledgement to the warning.  
In a similar mishap that developed much more rapidly, Colgan Air Flight 3407, while en 
route to Buffalo, New York, experienced a nose-high, low-airspeed attitude which caused the 
stick shaker warning system to activate and the auto-pilot to disengage. Startled, the crew 
proceeded down the wrong decision-making path; ultimately taking the aircraft from an 
impeding stall to a fully developed stall from which they were unable to recover (Geiselman, 
Johnson, & Buck, 2013).   
 Last, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 departed Addis Ababa Bole International Airport on 
March 10, 2019 headed for Nairobi. Shortly after take-off, a deviation between the left and right 
angle-of-attack sensors, and the left and right airspeed, altitude, and flight director bars were 
recorded and the aircraft entered a series of abrupt nose-down pitches (Aircraft Accident 
Investigation Bureau [AAIB], 2020). At the same time, the stick shaker on the Boeing 737 
aircraft activated and remained activated during the entire six-minute sequence resulting in a 
significant physical and cognitive demand on the captain (the pilot flying) and impeding 
effective communication between the captain and the first officer. While the aircraft was not 
actually in a developed stall as with the previous two examples, the additional excessive 
cognitive loads the stick shaker placed on the crew was likely highly disruptive and distracting in 
111
Whittemore and Woods: Negative Response to Stall Awareness
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2021
nature. The crew of Ethiopian Airlines were unable to successfully bring their aircraft back under 
control and they crashed approximately 37 miles southeast of Addis Ababa.  
A well-designed alarm system should call the operators’ attention to the most pertinent 
information required to seek conflict resolution without over-saturating the user to the point of 
work overload (Endsley & Jones, 2004; Curtis, Jentsch, & Wise, 2010) or overstimulating the 
user to the point of startle (Martin et al., 2012). A design goal for any warning system should be 
to assist the operator in maintaining situational awareness during flight and while simultaneously 
avoiding an aerodynamic stall.  
Geiselman et al. (2013) state that automation and automated warning systems should 
incorporate a context-awareness design solution. They believe that a user-centric system should 
be able to communicate its limitations effectively and provide prompts that guide the operator in 
the appropriate direction at the appropriate time (Geiselman et al., 2013). Situation awareness 
(SA) is a large part of establishing this context-aware design, and therefore, the first goal in the 
design process should be to maintain SA. SA supports the ability to extract information to use in 
the effective decision-making processes (Wickens, 2000). Endsley and Jones (2004) developed a 
series of situation awareness-oriented design (SAOD) principles that are meant to minimize 
disruption to ongoing activities, present information directly to user in order to support 
comprehension and provide projection support. Applying the following principles can help lead 
towards a more proactive stall alert system:  
• Principle 2 – present information directly to support comprehension 
• Principle 25 – don’t make people reliant on alarms — provide projection support 
• Principle 31 – minimize alarm disruption to ongoing activities 
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Principle 2: Present Information Directly to Support Comprehension 
 Principle 2—present information directly to support comprehension, is a principle 
relating to the amount of information and the way it shall be relayed to the operator (Endsley & 
Jones, 2004).  Due to a human’s limited working memory and attention, it is important to 
produce easy-to-understand and concise information to the operator. As an aircraft approaches a 
stall, it would not be beneficial to have a flashing number indicating the AOA of the aircraft in 
degrees. The visual indicator would draw the operator’s attention away from the overall 
assessment of the aircraft, environment, and array and cause him or her to focus on the indicator 
instead of mitigating the situation.  
A better warning simplifies the process by allowing the pilot to understand the problem 
immediately (Endsley & Jones, 2004). For example, in many current airframes, as the airspeed 
approaches the current aerodynamic stall speed, the stall warning horn annunciates, and the stick 
shaker activates (“Stall Warning”, 2014). The aural indication of STALL should tell the operator 
exactly what the situation is if he or she is able to receive that information. Likewise, the haptic 
warning of the stick shaker indicates where the operator should apply physical force in order to 
correct the situation. The aural and physical warnings provide information and continue until the 
situation is remedied. The information is presented directly to the pilot, without the need to 
organize or decipher. 
Principle 25: Don’t Make People Reliant on Alarms—Provide Projection Support 
 Principle 25—don’t make people reliant on alarms—provide projection support, 
encompasses the idea of giving pilots situational awareness in order to recognize a potential issue 
before a problem manifests. Warnings require operators have an understanding of the alarm and 
why an alarm is sounding (Endsley & Jones, 2004). A potentially better solution to a simple 
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awareness warning is one which provides operators with information to be proactive—for 
example, terrain-following software no longer only alerts the pilot to impending terrain, but often 
includes proactive instructions such as PULL UP.   
 The Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is another example of software that has 
evolved beyond simply alerting pilots to impending situations. The software actively instructs 
pilots not only to pitch up or down but gives very specific visual information to provide the 
optimal rate solution for escaping the threat. Terrain warnings and TCAS are examples of 
proactive alarms that provide projection support to aviators. Few stall warning systems provide 
proactive projection support.  
 Stall warning systems only provide information that a stall is either impending or already 
in progress. One way to provide projection support is with trend data (Endsley & Jones, 2004). 
Because stalls can occur for multiple reasons, it may be difficult to accurately provide projection 
support for every situation. However, trends can provide stall systems with decision-making 
support including audio warnings: STALL, ADD POWER or STALL, PUSH DOWN instead of 
simply STALL. A stall situation is the result of the critical AOA being exceeded and while 
resolution typically requires the aircraft to gain speed through full advancement of the thrust 
controls and by lowering AOA, there could be select situations where these options are not 
desired and sound reasoning would still have to be applied.   
Principle 31: Minimize Alarm Disruption to Ongoing Activities 
 Principle 31—minimize alarm disruptions to ongoing activities, highlights that an alarm 
in a system that is more likely to register false alarms, or alarms for less immediate situations, 
are more likely to be disabled and can interfere with routine flight. Conversely, the more 
immediate the situation is, and the rarer the event is for which the alarm is sounding, the more 
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invasive the alarm should be. The stall warning system should be activated immediately and 
systematically when the aircraft exceeds a predetermined angle of attack. The warning system 
should continuously alarm and provide warning inputs until the aircraft no longer exceeds 
predetermined AOA.  
It would be detrimental for the pilot to have the ability to turn off the stall system, or even 
to be able to silence the aural horn (Endsley & Jones, 2004). As the aircraft approaches an 
impending stall, the operator should focus all primary attention on stall-recovery procedures. The 
stall warning system should be loud and forceful enough to command the attention of the pilots; 
however, the system should not be so loud or aggressive as to create an amygdala hijack or 
prevent communication between pilots.  
It is important the warning system ensures the pilots are aware of the situation yet 
balances against the disruption of the actual warning response (Endsley & Jones, 2004). The stall 
warning should forcefully capture the attention of the operator and guide him or her to the area 
that needs attention rather than startle the individual into undesirable performance. The stall 
warning should continue to annunciate and only lessen as the risk to the aircraft is mitigated. 
While many alarms require minimum disruption to the ongoing activities, the stall warning horn 
could be the exception as it is actually necessary for the pilot to focus almost all energy into 
preventing a stall when the warning is active.   
 It is important for operators to distinguish multiple alarms and warnings through vast 
amounts of display and warning data, without specific warnings being summarily dismissed 
entirely. When a stall warning occurs, the alarm is often violent, loud, and forceful. The alarm is 
designed to capture full attention of the pilot and reinforce the imminent danger. It is possible for 
systems such as the stall warning to actually diminish global SA (Endsley & Jones, 2004). While 
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the system attempts to project awareness of the impending stall, overall situation awareness may 
be completely lost during the period of recovery. The potential becomes high that other 
significant factors might be missed during this attention capture phase. This idea ties into the 
theory that a startled pilot may temporarily lose cognitive and fine-psychomotor ability to 
maintain effective decision-making (Martin et al., 2012). In its attempt to direct a pilot to the 
most immediate situation, any form of global SA might be temporarily lost.  
The counterargument is that an approaching stall is an immediate and ultimately deadly 
state and therefore all awareness should be placed directly on an impending danger. There must 
be a balance in the creation of a stall warning system that enhances situation awareness for the 
operators and lowers potential for startle induced limbic hijack, while still appropriately 
emphasizing the importance of such a high-level threat. A stall warning system that supports the 
recovery of global SA is the most ideal because it facilitates effective decision-making (Endsley 
& Jones, 2004; Wickens, 2000). For example, one potential idea is in an automated system 
where the auto-pilot and auto-throttles physically correct the attitude and airspeed of the aircraft 
in order to mitigate stall parameters. The action would be in conjunction with an aural warning 
of STALL—INCREASE THRUST, or STALL—REDUCE AOA. The warning is intended to 
provide the operator the reasoning for the action and guide him or her to the circumstances for 
which the correction was warranted—in this case, excessive AOA.  
Situation-Awareness Measurement Assessments 
Due to the increasing use and efficiency of automated flight management systems, the 
human in the interface has largely been relegated to the role of observer (Breton & Bossé, 2002). 
When conflict is introduced in the form of an emergency, however, the person in the system 
must divert his or her attention from maintaining an active monitor and scan to becoming the 
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problem-solver.  The cognitive load changes when the operator must begin dealing with the 
situation and subsequently applying the decision-making and physical inputs required to mitigate 
the problem to a satisfactory outcome.  
In high-stress, highly dynamic situations, valuable information is often left disregarded or 
underutilized because the human brain simply cannot react fast enough (Berka et al., 2007). In 
addition, if the individual is startled, neurochemicals are released “that paralyze the brain’s 
ability to think and activate our instincts for fight, flight, freeze, and appease” (Glaser & Tartell, 
2014, p. 63). In this state of amygdala hijack, the person can command unexpected or unintended 
responses including irrational and destructive inputs that are contrary to the safe mitigation of the 
problem (Freedman, 2009). A design’s ability to help develop or maintain situation awareness 
(SA) must be assessed in order to determine if the proposed design is the most correct course of 
action.   
Conclusion 
The role of any aircraft warning system is to help notify and prioritize the issues for the 
pilot (Ensdley & Jones, 2004).  Any disruption to spatial awareness, systems awareness, or task 
awareness results in a disruption in the ability to execute safe flight (Wickens, 2002).  Thus, 
cognitive errors are ultimately the result of a deficiency in flight monitoring (Muthard & 
Wickens, 2002) as well as an involuntary response to startle (Martin et al., 2012). Subject matter 
experts indicate the primary goal for any pilot is to maintain situation awareness, execute 
effective decision-making, and to avoid aircraft stall. However, to affect the proper outcome, 
stall warning systems must be designed with SA in mind.  
Designing a stall warning system is a challenging process.  The warning system must 
adequately warn the pilot without causing a cognitive disruption by placing the pilot into 
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amygdala hijack.  Very little research has been completed connecting amygdala hijack to stall 
warning systems; therefore, further research will be extremely valuable. A properly designed 
system must help an individual identify and prioritize the issues without hindering the process 
itself. The alarm has the extra burden of maintaining a delicate balance between immediacy and 
projection — as in capturing the operator’s attention and directing him or her directly to the issue 
— while ensuring the attention capture isn’t in the form of startle inducing cognitive disruption. 
The latter can prevent the individual from moving beyond the attention capture phase and into 
the provide information stage required to safely mitigate the situation (Laughery & Wogalter, 
2006; Martin et al., 2012).   
There are many ways to measure the metrics of a stall recovery and the effects of a stall 
warning system on a pilot. Psychophysiological measures can measure startle effect and the 
aggressiveness of a particular alarm. Behavior and performance measures could detect levels of 
SA during high periods of activity.  Ultimately, with the help of user-centered design, 
preventative safety measures can help prevent future aircraft accidents.  Through design, testing, 
and documenting, researchers can help provide increased SA during stall warning.  
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